Angela Valenzuela, Ph.D.
October 31, 2026
With Election Day just around the corner, there is growing reason for hope that something extraordinary may be unfolding in Texas and across the nation. Two recent analyses—one by distinguished UT San Antonio demographer Dr. Rogelio Sáenz and another by CNN Chief Data Analyst and guru Harry Enten—suggest that we may be witnessing the beginnings of a significant political realignment.
Add to these findings the latest Harvard Youth Poll, and an intriguing possibility emerges: Could America be approaching another Obama-style wave, this time driven by a younger, increasingly diverse electorate that is demanding change, even while expressing deep dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party itself? The evidence is compelling, even if the outcome remains uncertain.
In his illuminating October 29 San Antonio Express-News commentary, "Will Texas' Shifting Voting Demographics Influence the Election Outcome?," Sáenz (2026) documents the remarkable transformation occurring across our state. Between 2022 and 2024, Texas gained approximately 688,000 citizens of voting age, with nonwhite Texans accounting for more than four-fifths of that growth.
The Latino voting-age population increased by 209,000, the African American population by 165,000, and the Asian population by 138,000, compared with approximately 131,000 additional white citizens of voting age. Perhaps even more consequential are the generational differences: the number of Latino, African American, and Asian citizens ages 18 to 34 grew by more than 173,000, while the comparable white population declined by approximately 33,000. These numbers tell us something important. Texas is changing, and its political possibilities are changing along with it.
Equally significant is where these transformations are taking place. Sáenz (2026) identifies the rapid diversification of suburban counties surrounding Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, including Kaufman, Ellis, and Comal counties. These suburban communities, once associated with reliably Republican voting patterns, are becoming more racially and ethnically diverse and, in some places, more politically competitive.
Of course, demographic change does not automatically produce political change. Latinos, African Americans, Asian Americans, and young people are not monolithic voting blocs. Political affiliations, economic circumstances, histories, and personal experiences all matter. Yet Sáenz' analysis reminds us that Texas is neither politically static nor destined to remain as it has been for more than three decades. The potential for change is real, provided that demographic shifts translate into meaningful democratic participation.
Now consider the national picture. In his final pre-election analysis presented on CNN, Harry Enten offers projections that would have seemed almost unimaginable just months ago. Treat yourself to a dose of Harry Enten's forecasts on CNN's Youtube channel, by the way. His enthusiasm is infectious.
Drawing on an aggregation of electoral models, Enten reports a 92% estimated probability that Democrats will win control of the U.S. House of Representatives, with a projected 237 Democratic seats to 198 Republican seats.
His Senate forecast is equally striking: Democrats' estimated probability of winning control has increased by 19 percentage points since August, reaching 71%, with a projected 52 Democratic seats to 48 Republican seats (CNN, 2026). Remarkably, Enten'sprojected Senate map even places Texas in the Democratic column. These are probabilistic projections, not election results, and Enten acknowledges the possibility of polling errors. Nevertheless, taken together, they suggest that the political winds may be shifting in ways that could substantially reshape the balance of power in Washington.

What makes these forecasts especially fascinating is the emerging role of young voters. According to the October 22 Harvard Youth Poll, Democrats lead Republicans by an astonishing 37 percentage points among likely voters ages 18 to 29—63% to 26%.
Yet this is hardly a ringing endorsement of the Democratic establishment. Fully 66% of registered young voters disapprove of congressional Democrats' performance, while 74% disapprove of congressional Republicans. Moreover, 63% of young people who say they will definitely vote describe their congressional vote primarily as opposition to President Trump and his policies.
Only 9% of young Americans believe the country is moving in the right direction (Institute of Politics, Harvard Kennedy School, 2026). The findings reveal a generation confronting economic insecurity, distrust of political institutions, and profound anxiety about its future. One important caution is that only 33% say they will definitely vote, below the 40% recorded before the 2018 and 2022 midterms. Whether this dissatisfaction becomes a historic electoral surge remains to be seen.
This is where the comparison to the Obama wave of 2008—remember that?—becomes especially interesting. Barack Obama's historic election was powered in significant part by a multiracial, multigenerational coalition energized by the promise of hope and change. According to Keeter et al. (2008), Obama captured 66% of the vote among Americans under age 30, compared with 31% for John McCain. Young voters were not only an important electoral constituency but also enthusiastic campaign volunteers and participants in an unprecedented political mobilization effort.
What may be emerging in 2026 is something different but potentially no less consequential. Rather than an electorate inspired primarily by a charismatic political leader or enthusiastic loyalty to a party, we may be witnessing a growing coalition of citizens frustrated with political dysfunction and corruption, and massive income and economic inequality, and what they perceive as threats to their rights and democratic institutions.
This may be less a wave of enthusiasm for the Democratic Party than a wave of determination to change the direction of the country. If so, it would be a mistake for Democratic leaders to interpret electoral victories as unconditional endorsements. Young voters appear to be demanding something more substantive: accountability, integrity, economic opportunity, and political leadership that takes their aspirations seriously (Institute of Politics, Harvard Kennedy School, 2026).
For those of us who have devoted our lives to public education, civil rights, and the democratic purposes of schooling, these developments carry profound significance. The struggles over public school funding, takeovers, book bans, educational opportunity, immigrant rights, academic freedom, and the teaching of our histories are not isolated policy disputes. They are connected to the larger question of whose voices, knowledge, and experiences count in our democracy.
Here in Texas, where restrictions on diversity initiatives, growing political interference in universities, and battles over curriculum have generated deep concern, the stakes could hardly be higher. The younger generations now entering the electorate are also the generations who have experienced these institutional struggles firsthand. Their political participation offers the possibility of a more responsive public education system and a renewed commitment to universities as places of intellectual freedom, critical inquiry, and democratic possibility.
I am particularly encouraged by what these developments could mean for Texas. For decades, many Texans committed to educational equity, social justice, and representative democracy for an increasingly diverse polity have struggled against political structures that often seem impervious to change. Yet history teaches us that even deeply entrenched political arrangements can shift when communities organize, generations change, and people come to recognize their collective power. And that's what I and many others see and feel is happening at the grassroots in Texas.
Sáenz' (2026) demographic analysis helps explain the structural conditions that make change possible. Enten's forecasts suggest that these changes may be influencing electoral expectations at the national level (CNN, 2026). And the Harvard Youth Poll provides an important glimpse into the attitudes of a generation that may be ready to challenge the political status quo (Institute of Politics, Harvard Kennedy School, 2026). Together, these findings suggest that what is happening in Texas is part of a much larger national transformation.
As we approach November 3, I find myself returning to a simple but powerful distinction: Demographic change creates political possibilities, but democratic change absolutely nevertheless also requires collective agency.
There is no guarantee that Texas will turn blue, that Democrats will control both houses of Congress, or that young voters will participate in sufficient numbers to produce an Obama-style wave. Nor would an electoral victory, by itself, resolve the institutional and economic injustices that have brought us to this moment. But there is reason for hope. Our country is changing, our state is changing, and a new generation is making its voice heard.
Perhaps the most important question is not simply which political party will prevail on Election Day, but whether this emerging movement can help build a more inclusive, accountable, and genuinely democratic future. That is the possibility worth celebrating—and the promise that must extend well beyond any single election.
Tuesday, November 3rd is your final day to vote. Remember, your vote is your voice. Su voto es su voz! Sí se puede! Yes we can!
#ChangeWave #TexasVotes #YouthVote #Democracy #Midterms2026
References
CNN. (2026, October 30). Midterm elections 2026: Harry Enten's final prediction [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wur9BVrXaDc
Institute of Politics, Harvard Kennedy School. (2026, October 22). Harvard Youth Poll: Democrats lead by 37 points among likely young voters. https://iop.harvard.edu/press-releases/harvard-youth-poll-democrats-lead-37-points-among-likely-young-voters
Keeter, S., Horowitz, J., & Tyson, A. (2008, November 13). Young voters in the 2008 election. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2008/11/13/young-voters-in-the-2008-election/
Sáenz, R. (2026, October 29). Will Texas' shifting voting demographics influence the election outcome? San Antonio Express-News. https://www.expressnews.com/opinion/commentary/article/voting-demographics-change-texas-22497157.php
Will Texas' shifting voting demographics influence the election outcome?
By Rogelio Sáenz, For the Express-News | Oct 29, 2026
Major shifts in the upcoming elections have occurred over the past month.
Texas is an increasingly competitive state with narrow poll margins in the top three political races, and Latinos have been dubbed as the nation’s most important swing voters. From the start of early voting, record-breaking numbers of voters have queued in long lines for their chance to vote.
How have Texas voters changed over the past two years?
I draw on the most recent data Texas citizens of voting age population, or CVAP — people 18 and older who are U.S. citizens — available from the 2022 and 2024 American Community Survey to address this query. Unfortunately, the 2025 data and 2026 data are not yet available.
Between 2022 and 2024, the Texas voting-age population increased by 688,000, a rise of 3.4%. Nonwhites account for more than four-fifths of the 688,000 people added to the state’s voting-age population. Latino (209,000), African American (165,000) and Asian (138,000) newcomers outnumber the 131,000 whites added between 2022 and 2024.
The Asian voting-age population rose the fastest, a 16% increase, followed by African Americans with a rise of 6.5%. The growth rates were slower among Latinos (3.2%) and whites (1.4%).
There are major racial/ethnic splits along the lines of age. While the number of Latino, African American and Asian people 18 to 34 years old rose by more than 173,000, the number of whites declined by approximately 33,000. Yet the nearly 140,000 potential white voters 65 and older added in the past two years is comparable to the 137,000 additional Latinos, African Americans and Asians.
Interstate migration patterns across racial/ethnic groups are also revealing. I calculate net migration of the CVAP by subtracting people who migrated to Texas in the 2023-2024 period from the number who migrated out of Texas to other states during this period.
The CVAP net migration of African Americans (40,500) and Latinos (34,500) was significantly higher than that of whites (21,000). Latinos and whites moving to Texas in the past two years most commonly came from California, while African Americans most likely originated from Louisiana.
The CVAP international movement also is instructive. I tallied the number of people who migrated to Texas from abroad (including Puerto Rico) in the 2023-2024 period. Given that the focus is on citizens of voting age, international movers include people who were born in the United States as well as naturalized citizens. The number of the CVAP who came to Texas from abroad includes 41,000 Latinos, 35,500 whites, 19,000 African Americans and 13,500 Asians.
Growth of the CVAP occurred disproportionately in counties with the largest metropolitan cities as well as suburban counties. The 10 counties with the most rapid percentage increases are all suburban counties in the Dallas, Houston and San Antonio metropolitan areas.
Kaufmann County experienced the most rapid growth at 18%, followed by Ellis County at 14% and Comal County at 11%. One thing is certain: Fast-growing suburbs are becoming less white and less Republican.
Many Texans have cast their ballots, while others will be turning out Tuesday.
Will Texas finally turn blue after more than three decades? A lot will depend on continued high voter turnout and the former supporters of President Donald Trump who plan to vote Democratic this time.
Still, halting or overturning Trump policies and actions that have led to mass discontent over the economy, rising consumer prices, mass deportation and the war with Iran will require Democrats gaining an advantage in both houses.
Rogelio Sáenz is a professor in the Department of Sociology and Demography at the University of Texas at San Antonio. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of UTSA.





